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Forensic science, reliability and scientific validity: Advice from America 
Tony Ward,∞ Gary Edmond†, Kristy A. Martire§ and Natalie Wortley¶ 
 
1. Introduction 
In this article we review an important report produced by the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-
Comparison Methods (the PCAST report).1 The PCAST report builds on an earlier report prepared by 
the National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: The Path 
Forward published in 2009 (the NRC report).2 These reports are focused on the organisation, funding 
and practice of the forensic sciences in the United States. In their deliberate and unflinching concern 
with probative value, particularly the validity and reliability of procedures used by forensic scientists 
and the way opinions are expressed in expert reports and testimony, both have application to 
England and Wales. Both reports speak directly to forensic scientists, law enforcement, lawyers and 
courts. Forensic scientists, advocates, judges and legislators must respond to criticisms and 
recommendations if we hope to place the forensic sciences on firm scientific foundations.3 
PCAST ‘is an advisory group of the Nation’s leading scientists and engineers, appointed by the 
President’ to advise on ‘the full range of issues where understandings from the domains of science, 
technology, and innovation bear potentially on the policy choices before the President.’4 The PCAST 
report is primarily oriented toward forensic feature-comparison procedures. Used routinely in the 
US, as well as England and Wales, these procedures (or methods) ‘aim to determine whether an 
evidentiary sample (e.g., from a crime scene) is or is not associated with a potential source sample 
(e.g., from a suspect) based on the presence of similar patterns, impressions, features, or 
characteristics in the sample and the source.’5 Typically they involve comparison and some kind of 
‘matching’. They include ‘the analysis of: DNA, hair, latent fingerprints, firearms and spent 
ammunition, tool and toolmarks, shoeprints and tire tracks, bitemarks, and handwriting’ as well as 
voices and images.6 Following on from concerns about the level of scientific support for forensic 
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2 The NRC report is also known as the National Academy of Sciences (or NAS) report. The PCAST report is, like the NRC 
report, critical in tone. PCAST was assessing reforms, following the NRC report, to assist institutions such as the newly 
established National Commission on Forensic Science. 
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and criticism was primarily directed at the research base, along with (uncritical) legal acceptance and reliance. 
4 PCAST report, iv. For a list of the Council, the working group and advisors, see PCAST report v-ix. 
5 PCAST report, 23, Box 1. 
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science practices expressed in the NRC report, PCAST sought to fill a conspicuous gap by examining 
‘the fundamental scientific validity and reliability of many forensic methods used every day in 
courts.’7 
Before moving to review the findings and recommendations in the PCAST report, it is useful briefly 
to summarise the findings from the earlier inquiry conducted by the National Research Council 
(NRC), the research arm of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS). 
 
2. Building on the NRC report (and ongoing responses) 
In 2009 the NRC published the outcome of a multi-year review of the forensic sciences in the United 
States. The inquiry was prompted by mistakes exposed through innocence projects and a high-
profile error by FBI fingerprint examiners in the mis-identification of Brandon Mayfield.8 The 
resulting report – Strengthening the forensic sciences in the United States: The path forward – was 
unprecedented in its critical assessment.9 The NRC report was summarised by PCAST in the following 
terms: 
The 2009 report described a disturbing pattern of deficiencies common to many of the 
forensic methods routinely used in the criminal justice system, most importantly a lack of 
rigorous and appropriate studies establishing their scientific validity, concluding that ‘much 
forensic evidence—including, for example, bitemarks and firearm and toolmark 
identifications—is introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful scientific validation, 
determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the discipline.’10  
The 2009 NRC study concluded that many of these difficulties with forensic science may stem 
from the historical reality that many methods were devised as rough heuristics to aid criminal 
investigations and were not grounded in the validation practices of scientific research. … the 
report found the problems plaguing the forensic science community are systemic and 
pervasive—the result of factors including a high degree of fragmentation (including disparate 
and often inadequate training and educational requirements, resources, and capacities of 
laboratories); a lack of standardization of the disciplines, insufficient high-quality research and 
education; and a dearth of peer-reviewed studies establishing the scientific basis and validity 
of many routinely used forensic methods.11 
Like the NRC report, the PCAST report displays an unremitting commitment to the need for scientific 
research. Indeed, the report is oriented toward addressing ‘A Critical Gap: Scientific Validity’.12  
We now turn to describe the findings and recommendations presented in the PCAST report. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Wortley, ‘Interpreting image evidence: Facial mapping, police familiars and super-recognisers in England and Australia’ 
(2016) 3 Journal of International and Comparative Law 473. 
7 PCAST report, 39. 
8 See e.g. Brandon Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 2011); Office of the Inspector General, A review of the FBI's progress in responding to the 
recommendations in the Office of the Inspector General Report on the fingerprint misidentification in the Brandon Mayfield 
Case (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011). 
9 For a detailed review of the NRC report, see Gary Edmond, ‘What Lawyers should know about the forensic “sciences”’ 
(2015) 36 Adelaide Law Review 33. 
10 PCAST report, 22. See NRC report, pp. 107-8. 
11 PCAST report, 32-3. See also NRC report, 128. On the misguided interest in ‘uniqueness’, see PCAST report, 61-62.  
12 PCAST report, 39. 
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3. Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods 
The PCAST report builds on previous reviews of the forensic sciences, explains the role of scientific 
validity (for courts), and describes scientific criteria for validity and reliability of forensic feature-
comparison methods. It then evaluates the scientific validity of: (i) DNA analysis of single-source and 
simple-mixture samples; (ii) DNA analysis of complex-mixture samples; (iii) bitemark analysis; (iv) 
latent fingerprint analysis; (v) firearms analysis; (vi) footwear analysis; and (vii) hair analysis. The 
report concludes by making recommendations to US domestic institutions, such as the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory, the Attorney General, and finally the judiciary. Key 
themes of the report and representative excerpts are reproduced below. 
A. Scientific validity and reliability must be demonstrated through empirical studies 
PCAST draws on the scientific discipline of metrology to define scientific validity and reliability:13 
For a metrological method to be scientifically valid and reliable, the procedures that comprise 
it must be shown, based on empirical studies, to be repeatable, reproducible, and accurate, at 
levels that have been measured and are appropriate to the intended application.14 
This selection was conditioned by the fact that the ‘feature-comparison methods … all belong to the 
same broad scientific discipline, metrology, which is “the science of measurement and its 
application,” in this case to measuring and comparing features.’15 
The key constructs that comprise scientific reliability are defined: 
By ‘repeatable,’ we mean that, with known probability, an examiner obtains the same results, 
when analyzing samples from the same sources. 
By ‘reproducible,’ we mean that, with known probability, different examiners obtain the same 
result, when analyzing the same samples. 
By ‘accurate,’ we mean that, with known probability, an examiner obtains correct results both 
(1) for samples from the same source (true positives) and (2) for samples from different 
sources (true negatives).16 
The PCAST report relies on two distinct types of validity: foundational validity and validity as applied: 
Foundational validity … means that a method can, in principle, be reliable.17 
Validity as applied means that the method has been reliably applied in practice.18 
In other words, foundational validity refers to the extent to which a method is able to do what it is 
intended to do (e.g., link a sample to its source) in a repeatable, reproducible and accurate manner. 
Validity as applied incorporates the proficiency of the practitioner as well as the practical constraints 
associated with using the method under casework conditions. A method that is repeatable, 
                                                          
13 Metrology is the science of measurement and its application, PCAST report, 44. 
14 PCAST report, 47. 
15 PCAST report, 23. 
16 PCAST report, 47, Box 2. 
17 PCAST report, 4. 
18 PCAST report, 5. 
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reproducible and accurate under controlled laboratory conditions may not be valid in specific 
applications – e.g., a particular analyst may not be sufficiently proficient in the application of the 
technique or a sample may be inadequate or excessively degraded. 
The report then states two fundamental principles. First, foundational validity cannot be assumed: 
(1) methods must be presumed to be unreliable until their foundational validity has been 
established based on empirical evidence and (2) even then, scientific questioning and review 
of methods must continue on an ongoing basis.19  
Secondly, empirical testing is essential: 
… valid scientific knowledge can only be gained through empirical testing of specific 
propositions.20 
B. Error rate information must be reported (to the court) 
PCAST expressed concern about expert witnesses misrepresenting the value of their evidence in 
reports and testimony: 
 
… reviews have found that expert witnesses have often overstated the probative value of their 
evidence, going far beyond what the relevant science can justify. Examiners have sometimes 
testified, for example, that their conclusions are “100 percent certain;” or have “zero,” 
“essentially zero,” or “negligible,” error rate.  As many reviews—including the highly regarded 
2009 National Research Council study—have noted, however, such statements are not 
scientifically defensible: all laboratory tests and feature-comparison analyses have non-zero 
error rates.21 
 
The PCAST report explains that appropriate, empirically-derived, estimates of error are essential for 
the assessment of the probative value (and weight) of evidence and so must be determined and 
reported:22 
An empirical measurement of error rates is not simply a desirable feature; it is essential for 
determining whether a method is foundationally valid.23 
Moreover, the provision of error rates and other limitations are vital for decision makers in legal 
settings: 
Without appropriate estimates of accuracy, an examiner’s statement that two samples are 
similar—or even indistinguishable—is scientifically meaningless: it has no probative value, and 
considerable potential for prejudicial impact.24  
                                                          
19 PCAST report, 32. 
20 PCAST report, 46. 
21 PCAST report, 3 (emphasis added). See also NRC report, 142. 
22 The term ‘error’ is defined in the PCAST report, 51, Box 3. See also Bryan Found et al, ‘Reporting on the comparison and 
interpretation of pattern evidence: recommendations for forensic specialists’ (2012) 44 Australian Journal of Forensic 
Science 193. 
23 PCAST report, 53, 50: ‘It is necessary to have appropriate empirical measurements of a method’s false positive rate and 
the method’s sensitivity. As explained … it is necessary to know these two measures to assess the probative value of a 
method.’ 
24 PCAST report, 27 (emphasis added). To say that such evidence has no probative value is not, however, strictly correct, if 
probative value is thought of in orthodox legal terms. Such evidence may have some probative value, i.e. some tendency to 
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Unless opinions are expressed in empirically-predicated terms, that include limitations, they are not 
susceptible to rational evaluation.25 
PCAST also makes clear that appropriately designed ‘black box’ studies are required to determine 
the relevant error rate:26 
Importantly, error rates cannot be inferred from casework, but rather must be determined 
based on samples where the correct answer is known.27 
 
Unless procedures and practitioners are tested in circumstances where the correct answer (or 
ground truth) is known, it is not possible to be confident that the method is valid or the performance 
proficient. 
C. Forensic feature-comparison methods pose difficulties for jurors 
PCAST expressed particular concerns about the way evidence derived from forensic feature-
comparison procedures is expressed in reports and testimony, because 
[t]he vast majority of jurors have no independent ability to interpret the probative value of 
results based on the detection, comparison, and frequency of scientific evidence. … The 
potential prejudicial impact is unusually high, because jurors are likely to overestimate the 
probative value of a ‘match’ between samples.28 
Without insight into limitations, accuracy and error, as well as the frequency with which certain 
features appear (or are interrelated), jurors (and judges) are likely to over-estimate the value of 
forensic science evidence.29 They are vulnerable to concluding that similar traces (whether shoe 
prints or striations on shell casing and so on) were produced by the same person or object. 
D. Experience, training and professional practices cannot substitute for empirically demonstrated 
validity and reliability 
The report explains that it is inappropriate to infer validity or reliability on the basis of a forensic 
practitioner’s professional experience, casework, confidence or a variety of institutional practices 
(including accreditation and proficiency testing): 
Notably, some forensic practitioners espouse the notion that extensive ‘experience’ in casework 
can substitute for empirical studies of scientific validity.  Casework is not scientifically valid 
research, and experience alone cannot establish scientific validity.  In particular, one cannot 
reliably estimate error rates from casework because one typically does not have independent 
knowledge of the ‘ground truth’ or ‘right answer’.30 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
make the existence of a fact in issue more or less likely, but its degree of probative value is unknown. See Michael S. Pardo, 
‘Evidence Theory and the NAS Report on Forensic Science’ [2010] Utah L Rev 367.  
25 See Gary Edmond, ‘The conditions for rational (jury) evaluation of forensic science evidence’ (2015) 39 Melbourne 
University Law Review 1.  
26 Characteristics of ‘black-box’ trials to establish foundational validity are described in the PCAST report, 52, Box 4. 
27 PCAST report, 53. 
28 PCAST report, 45. See also Gary Edmond, Matt Thompson & Jason Tangen, ‘A guide to interpreting forensic testimony: 
Scientific approaches to fingerprint evidence’ (2013) 12 Law, Probability & Risk 1. 
29 PCAST report, 9, 149. Exaggeration and over-estimation are forms of unfair prejudice to the defendant. 
30 PCAST report, 32. 
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Importantly, good professional practices—such as the existence of professional societies, 
certification programs, accreditation programs, peer-reviewed articles, standardized 
protocols, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics—cannot substitute for actual evidence of 
scientific validity and reliability.31 
These conclusions have serious implications for conventional admissibility and procedural rules and 
the considerable confidence invested in adversarial procedures – frequently operating in the 
absence of validations studies and indicative error rates. 
E. Assessment of the validity of seven feature-comparison methods 
PCAST undertook one of the first independent reviews of forensic feature-comparison methods 
focusing on empirical evidence for foundational validity and validity as applied. We summarise the 
conclusions for the seven methods, noting that where there is foundational validity, validity as 
applied must also be considered. 
DNA analysis of single-source and simple-mixture samples:  
DNA analysis of samples from a single individual or from a ‘simple’ mixture of two individuals, one of 
whom is known, is found to be ‘an objective method in which the laboratory protocols are precisely 
defined and the interpretation involves little or no human judgment.’32 It meets all the criteria for 
foundational validity, while ‘the probability of a match arising by chance in the population by chance 
can be estimated directly from appropriate genetic databases and is extremely low’.33 
DNA analysis of complex-mixture samples:  
By contrast, the ‘analysis of complex mixtures of biological samples from multiple unknown 
individuals in unknown proportions’, while it uses similar laboratory techniques, involves a much 
greater degree of human judgment in the interpretation of the resulting DNA profile.34 PCAST finds 
that such ‘subjective analysis … has not been established to be foundationally valid and is not a 
reliable methodology.’35 
Bitemark analysis:  
PCAST’s view of the comparisons of marks on a victim or object with dental impressions taken from 
a suspect is particularly damning: 
available scientific evidence strongly suggests that examiners not only cannot identify the 
source of [a] bitemark with reasonable accuracy, they cannot even consistently agree on 
whether an injury is a human bitemark. For these reasons, PCAST finds that bitemark analysis 
is far from meeting the scientific standards for foundational validity.36 
Latent fingerprint analysis:  
Latent fingerprint analysis, i.e. the comparison of impressions made or developed on an item with 
prints taken from a known subject, or with another latent print, is found to be:  
                                                          
31 PCAST report, 55. 
32 PCAST report, 7. 
33 PCAST report, 7, 69-75. See also NRC report, 128-133. 
34 PCAST report, 7. 
35 PCAST report, 8, 75-83. Contrast Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2, where the court allowed the forensic practitioner to 
express a subjective impression. 
36 PCAST report, 9, 83-87. See also NRC report, 173-176. 
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a foundationally valid subjective methodology—albeit with a false positive rate that is 
substantial and is likely to be higher than expected by many jurors based on longstanding 
claims about the infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The false-positive rate could be as high as 1 
error in 306 cases based on the FBI study and 1 error in 18 cases based on a study by another 
crime laboratory. In reporting results of latent-fingerprint examination, it is important to state 
the false-positive rates based on properly designed validation studies.37 
Firearms analysis:  
In discussing the analysis of ‘toolmarks’ on ammunition to identify the weapon from which 
ammunition was fired, PCAST acknowledges that there has been significant progress since the NRC 
report in 2009, in that one substantial ‘black box’ study has been conducted, the results of which are 
available online.38 However, 
[t]he scientific criteria for foundational validity require that there be more than one such  
study, to demonstrate reproducibility, and that studies should ideally be published in the 
peer-reviewed scientific literature. Accordingly, the current evidence still falls short of the 
scientific criteria for foundational validity.39 
Footwear analysis:  
PCAST does not consider the validity of identifications from shoeprints of ‘class characteristics’ such 
as make and size of shoe, but points to a lack of appropriate studies or analyses of ‘identifying 
characteristics’ which purportedly link an impression to a specific shoe: ‘Such associations are 
unsupported by any meaningful evidence or estimates of their accuracy and thus are not 
scientifically valid’.40 
Hair analysis:  
PCAST did not examine the comparison of microscopic features of hair in depth, but its review of the 
papers cited in documentation submitted by the Department of Justice found ‘that these studies do 
not establish the foundational validity and reliability of hair analysis.’41 
 
F. Recommendations for the Attorney General. 
PCAST made two sets of recommendations to the US Attorney General. The first addresses the use 
of feature-comparison methods in federal prosecutions, and the second concerns guidelines on 
expert testimony prepared by the Department of Justice (DOJ). The most radical recommendations 
are the following: 
The Attorney General should direct attorneys appearing on behalf of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) to ensure expert testimony in court about forensic feature-comparison 
methods meets the scientific standards for scientific validity.42 
                                                          
37 PCAST report, 9-10, 87-104. See also NRC report, 136-145; National Institute of Standards and Technology, Latent Print 
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach (US Department of Commerce, 
2012); Lord Anthony Campbell, The Fingerprint Inquiry Report (APS Group Scotland, 2011). 
38 David P. Baldwin, Stanley J. Bajic, Max Morris, and Daniel Zamzow, A Study of False-Positive and False-Negative Error 
Rates in Cartridge Case Comparisons (2014), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249874.pdf 
39 PCAST report, 11, 104-114. See also NRC report, 150-155. 
40 PCAST report, 13, 114-117. See also NRC report, 145-150 and R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439.   
41 PCAST report, 13, 118-122. See also NRC report, 155-161. 
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Where there are not adequate empirical studies and/or statistical models to provide 
meaningful information about the accuracy of a forensic feature-comparison method, DOJ 
attorneys and examiners should not offer testimony based on the method.43 
Given the findings reviewed above, these recommendations would dramatically curtail the use of 
forensic science evidence in federal prosecutions. Other recommendations deal with encouraging 
research and revised guidelines on the reporting of forensic science evidence; stressing the need to 
include information about error rates when these are known, and to point out the possibility of error 
in every case. 
G. Recommendations for the Judiciary 
Finding  ‘lack of rigor in the assessment of the scientific validity of forensic evidence’ to be ‘a real 
and significant weakness in the judicial system’,44 PCAST made one recommendation to the US 
judiciary regarding the use of scientific validity as a foundation for expert testimony. 
Recommendation 8 states: 
(A)  When deciding the admissibility of expert testimony, Federal judges should take into 
account the appropriate scientific criteria for assessing scientific validity including: … 
(i) foundational validity ... and (ii) validity as applied. ... 
(B)  Federal judges, when permitting an expert to testify about a foundationally valid 
feature-comparison method, should ensure that testimony about the accuracy of the 
method and the probative value of proposed identifications is scientifically valid in 
that it is limited to what the empirical evidence supports.45 
Finally, PCAST recommends the preparation of a best practices manual (8C) and advisory note 
relating to the admissibility of expert testimony based on forensic feature-comparison methods, as 
well as scientific education programs relevant to those methods (8D). 
While PCAST’s discussion consciously builds on US admissibility rules (notably Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the consequent revision of r702 of the US Federal Rules of Evidence), 
PCAST’s advice transcends jurisdictional practices.46 The PCAST report endeavours to capture what is 
required of any (adversarial) system interested in drawing upon and rationally assessing scientific 
and technical forms of evidence.  
 
4. Getting PCAST (and its concerns) before the courts of England and Wales 
The PCAST report’s conclusions are stark. It recommends that certain types of forensic feature-
comparison evidence should not be adduced in criminal cases because they do not meet scientific 
standards for foundational validity. In relation to some categories of expert evidence, the report’s 
conclusions will not surprise English readers. Bitemark comparison evidence, for example, is rarely 
seen in English courts. But English legal professionals may be rather more surprised to discover that 
some footwear comparison, firearms analysis, and DNA analysis of complex mixtures using 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
42 PCAST report , 18: Recommendation 6(A). 
43 PCAST report, 19: Recommendation 7(B)(ii). (italics added) 
44 PCAST report, 22. 
45 PCAST report, 19, 145. 
46 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. 509 US 579 (1993). 
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Combined Probability of Inclusion-based methods, were found to lack foundational validity.47 There 
are serious and, as yet, unanswered questions about the value of these procedures and how courts 
operating in a rational tradition should respond. The PCAST report has the potential to support 
challenges to such evidence. However, the mechanisms by which it (or the recommendations of the 
Forensic Science Regulator, discussed below) might be adduced, either before the tribunal of law in 
relation to preliminary admissibility decision-making, or before the tribunal of fact so that it can be 
taken into account when determining weight, are constrained by rules of evidence and procedure, 
by traditions of practice as well as by widespread ignorance 
There are three main ways in which the PCAST report might be used in English courts. First, it could 
support a submission that a particular expert’s opinion should be excluded on the ground that it 
does not have a ‘sufficiently reliable scientific basis’.48 If the method the expert has employed lacks 
foundational validity (or validity as applied), it may be insufficiently reliable to be admitted. The case 
law prior to what is now Criminal Practice Direction (CPD) 19A (originally issued in 2014) suggested 
that the threshold of reliability was a low one, but the Practice Direction could form the basis of a 
‘more rigorous’ approach, as promised by Leveson LJ in Stephen H v R.49  
Secondly, even if feature-comparison evidence is deemed to meet the threshold of ‘sufficient 
reliability’ under CPD 19A, the opinions expressed by the report’s authors could lend weight to a 
submission that the evidence ought to be excluded under either s.78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 or at common law.50  Discretionary exclusion, at least in theory, constitutes a 
second hurdle that expert evidence has to cross once it has cleared the (traditionally very low) 
threshold of reliability required for admissibility.51 In light of the Practice Direction, however, and 
also the Court of Appeal’s view as set out in Atkins,52 the possibility of using s.78 or the common law 
discretion to get a second bite at the cherry of unreliability is probably theoretical rather than real. A 
judge who accepted that the probative value of some piece of unvalidated scientific evidence was 
insufficient to outweigh the prejudicial effect of presenting it to the jury as ‘science’ would have 
ample grounds to deem the evidence ‘insufficiently reliable to be admitted’. 
Thirdly, if a judge declines to exclude the evidence, the report could potentially be used to challenge 
the forensic practitioner’s testimony before the tribunal of fact via cross-examination. Though, 
unless the practitioner accepts the authority of PCAST and particular findings, the status of the 
report remains uncertain. In criminal proceedings, an expert providing testimony derived using a 
procedure that has been questioned by PCAST ought to refer to the PCAST report as part of standard 
disclosure.53 In addition to general disclosure obligations that arise, particularly in relation to 
                                                          
47 We appreciate that there is work being undertaken in these areas, particularly in relation to mixed and complex DNA 
samples. 
48 Criminal Practice Directions 2015 Division V  (Oct, 2015) (hereafter CPD) accessed from the internet 02/01/2017 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/practice-direction/2015/crim-practice-directions-V-evidence-
2015.pdf, 19A.4. 
49 [2014] EWCA Crim 1555, [44]. See, for example, Law Commission of England and Wales, Expert Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings in England and Wales, HMSO, London, 2011, [1.8], [1.17], [1.21], [2.16], [3.3], [3.4], [6.10]. 
50 Section 82(3) of PACE preserves the court’s common law discretion to exclude evidence on the basis that its prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative value (R v Sang [1980] AC 425). 
51 R v Luttrell  [2004] 2 Cr App R 31, [28], [38]; R v Dlugosz [2013] 1 Cr App R 32, [27]. 
52 R v Atkins [2010] 1 Cr App R 8, [9]. 
53 See ACPO/CPS Guidance Booklet for Experts - Disclosure: Experts’ Evidence, Case Management and Unused Material 
(May 2010). Of course, disclosure of validation results or their absence should extend beyond the procedures discussed by 
PCAST to all scientific, medical and technical procedures grounding opinion evidence. 
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prosecution evidence,54 Criminal Procedure Rule (CrimPR) 19.4(h) imposes obligations on all experts 
to include in their reports such information as the court may need to decide whether evidence is 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted.55 
If PCAST were to be referenced by a forensic practitioner as part of their general disclosure 
obligations, the court would be able to take the report into account in evaluating the evidence. The 
PCAST report could then form part of the material to be weighed in the balance by the judge in 
determining whether expert evidence is sufficiently reliable, or whether to exclude the evidence. If 
the report is not referred to by the forensic practitioner, unlike the situation in civil cases, it cannot 
simply be adduced by the opposing advocate.  
In the civil courts a report of this type could be served and relied upon directly in court. In Rogers v 
Hoyle56 the Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of a report that had been prepared 
independently of the proceedings by a statutory body. Insofar as the report contained statements of 
fact, it was admissible, the rule against hearsay having been abolished by s.1 of the Civil Evidence Act 
1995. The expressions of opinion in the report were also admissible, since the authors were 
‘qualified experts on subjects involving special expertise’.57  Furthermore, the Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR) Part 35, which gives civil courts certain powers and duties to restrict expert evidence, did not 
apply because CPR 35.2 defines an ‘expert’ as ‘a person who has been instructed to give or prepare 
expert evidence for the purpose of proceedings’. As the authors had not been instructed to prepare 
the report for the proceedings, the claimants did not require the permission of the court to adduce 
it. Academic research appears to be admissible in civil proceedings on the same basis.58 
Similarly, the Criminal Procedure Rules define an ‘expert’ as someone who has been ‘instructed’ for 
the purposes of the proceedings,59 and thus it could be argued that a report such as PCAST’s does 
not have to comply with CrimPR 19. Criminal courts, however, remain subject to the rule against 
hearsay, and the PCAST report is undoubtedly hearsay. The only specific exception to the hearsay 
rule which looks remotely relevant is rule 1(a) of the common law rules preserved by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, s. 118(1), which covers ‘scientific works … as evidence of facts of a public nature’. 
The common law rule in question, however, applies to works that are referred to in the evidence of 
an expert witness.60 The only way in which the PCAST report could be admitted as evidence in itself 
is ‘in the interests of justice’ under s.114(1)(d) of the Act. While a court might not admit a public 
report from a different jurisdiction in the exercise of its inclusionary discretion, it is not outlandish to 
suggest that it might be in the interests of justice to do so. In the Canadian case of Bornyk,61 the 
report of the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry,62 among other sources, was consulted (on the judge’s own 
                                                          
54 There is a general obligation in criminal cases under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s. 3 to disclose 
evidence that reasonably might be considered capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the case for the 
defence. 
55 See generally Gary Edmond, ‘Expert evidence and the professional responsibilities of prosecutors’ in P. Roberts et al 
(eds), Integrity in the Criminal Process (Oxford, Hart, 2016) 225-245; Evidence-based Forensics Initiative, ‘Model forensic 
science’ (2016) 39 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 174. 
56 [2013] EWCA Civ 257.  
57 Ibid., [65]. 
58 Interflora v. Marks and Spencer plc [2014] EWCA Civ 1403, [161]; Hodge Malek et al (eds), Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed., 
1st Supp. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), para. 33-25; 
59 CrimPR 19.2.  
60 R v Abadom (1983) 76 Cr App R 48. 
61 R v Bornyk 2013 BCSC 1927. 
62 The Fingerprint Inquiry Report (2011) available at: 
http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20150428160022/http://www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk/inqu
iry/3127-2.html. 
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initiative) as evidence of the limitations of fingerprint evidence. Unfortunately, the judge consulted 
these materials only after counsel had made their submissions. The British Colombia Court of 
Appeal63 was critical of their being used in this way, pointing out that the material on which the 
judge relied was beyond the scope of judicial notice.64 Had the judge instead encouraged counsel to 
raise the issue at an earlier stage, this material might have been introduced in a way more consistent 
with the adversarial process.65 
There seems to be no reason why an opposing expert could not rely on the PCAST report as the basis 
for an opinion that, for example, a footwear examiner who purports to match a footwear impression 
to a shoe is using a method that lacks foundational validity and the examiner’s evidence may, in 
consequence, be unreliable or insufficiently reliable. As Davies and Piasecki note, the earlier NRC 
report has been used in that way in at least two cases – though without moving the Court of Appeal 
to act on it.66 Once the PCAST report has been referred to in this way by the opposing expert, the 
judge may take the report’s contents into account in evaluating the forensic practitioner’s 
conclusions. In deciding whether the evidence is ‘sufficiently reliable’ to be admitted, the PCAST 
report may be directly relevant as, under CPD 19A.5(a), the court may take into account the validity 
of the methods by which the forensic practitioner’s data was obtained. In addition, CPD 19A.6 
provides that a court ‘should be astute to identify potential flaws in [an expert’s] opinion which 
detract from its reliability’, including ‘being based on a hypothesis which has not been subjected to 
sufficient scrutiny (including, where appropriate, experimental or other testing)’.67  
Where PCAST’s report is directly relevant to the matters dealt with by the prosecution expert, it 
ought to be mentioned in the expert’s own report, either as part of the ‘range of opinion’ that the 
expert is required to ‘summarise’ under CrimPR 19.4(f)(i), or, if the expert accepts PCAST’s 
conclusions, as a necessary ‘qualification’ of her opinion under para. 19.4(g). An expert who does not 
accept PCAST’s conclusion that a particular technique is scientifically invalid should explain why.68 If 
the expert’s report does not comply with these requirements, the expert cannot give evidence 
unless the parties agree or the court so directs.69 Making the admissibility of expert evidence 
conditional on the expert drawing attention to adverse findings – to criticisms and recommendations 
produced by authoritative organisations such as PCAST – would be consistent with a series of Court 
of Appeal judgements stressing the need for judges to control the terms in which expert evidence is 
given.70 Conscientious scientists should, however, raise problems about validity themselves, rather 
than leave it to defence lawyers who may be unaware of the issues.71 
Where the expert’s evidence is admitted, an advocate who is aware of the issues could use the 
PCAST report to inform the cross-examination of the forensic practitioner about the reliability of the 
method used (and perhaps the competence and impartiality of the witness where PCAST is apposite 
                                                          
63 R v Bornyk 2014 BCCA 450.  Discussed in Gary Edmond, David Hamer and Emma Cunliffe, ‘A little ignorance is a 
dangerous thing: Engaging with exogenous knowledge not adduced by the parties’ (2016) 25 Griffith Law Review 383. 
64 The leading English case on the limited judicial notice that may be taken of scientific works is McQuaker v Goddard 
[1940] 1 KB 387, 400-1. 
65 This occurred at re-trial in January 2017. 
66 Otway v R [2011] EWCA Crim 3; R v Ferdinand [2014] EWCA Crim 1243. Gemma Davies and Emma Piasecki, ‘No More 
Laissez Faire?’ (2016) 80 J Crim L 327, 337. 
67 CPD 19A.6(a). 
68 CrimPR 19.4(f)(ii). 
69 This is the combined effect of CrimPR 19.3(3)(a) and 19.3(4)(a). 
70 R v Atkins [2010] 1 Cr App R 8, [23], [31]; R v Reed [2010] 1 Cr App R 23,  [122]; R v C [2011] 3 All ER 509, [32], R v Dlugosz 
[2013] 1 Cr App R 32. 
71 Davies and Piasecki, n. 66 above. 
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yet not disclosed).72 The report may then become evidence the tribunal of fact can take into account 
in deciding what weight to assign to the evidence, although weighing evidence whose true probative 
value is unknown is a difficult exercise, and juries may fail to appreciate how fundamental validation 
is to the production of reliable results. Here we might note that English judges have not uniformly 
recognised the centrality of foundational validity. 
We should also recognise that most cases involving expert evidence never go to trial. We have 
recently seen the introduction of streamlined reports, which (controversially) do not include 
information about validity or error.73 When prosecutors rely on expert opinion that is based upon a 
method that is not foundationally valid, legal practitioners need to appreciate this as an issue and, 
where appropriate, challenge the evidence (or demand more detail from investigators, forensic 
practitioners and prosecutors). This will require raising awareness of PCAST (and codes and 
guidelines produced by the Forensic Science Regulator, discussed below) among practitioners if the 
report is to have any impact in England and Wales. The apparent unwillingness of practitioners to 
engage with the domestic Practice Direction to date is not promising in this regard. 
5. ‘Sufficient reliability’ and common law principles 
Because of the lack of case law on CPD 19A, the precise nature of the ‘sufficient reliability’ test 
remains unclear. CPD 19A re-enacts an earlier Direction, which came into effect in October 2014,74 
and which partially implemented the recommendations of the Law Commission Report on Expert 
Evidence.75 What the Practice Direction could not implement was the Law Commission’s proposed 
statutory test of the admissibility of expert evidence. Since the Government declined to introduce 
the proposed legislation, the guidance which the Practice Direction adopts from the Law 
Commission report has to be applied in determining whether the common law criteria of 
admissibility are satisfied.76  
There are two possible interpretations of the relationship between CPD 19A and the common law. 
On one account, set out by one of us elsewhere, ‘sufficiently reliable to be admitted’ means 
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the three limbs of the common-law admissibility test: that the evidence 
is relevant; necessary to assist the jury (‘helpful’); and will be given by a competent witness.77 The 
second view, advocated by Stockdale and Jackson,78 is that ‘sufficiently reliable to be admitted’ is an 
independent fourth limb of the common-law test, introduced by Dlugosz and other cases where the 
Court of Appeal adopted the phrase used in the Law Commission report.79 The difficulty with this is 
that ‘sufficient reliability’ as a free-standing test is vacuous: it tells us nothing about what degree of 
reliability is ‘sufficient’. In our view the test is that the reliability of expert evidence must be 
sufficient to establish its relevance, to assist the jury, and to establish that the individual expert is 
                                                          
72 See Evidence-Based Forensics Initiative, ‘How to cross-examine forensic scientists: A guide for lawyers’ (2014) 39 
Australian Bar Review 174. 
73 See Oriola Sallavaci, ‘Streamlined reporting of forensic evidence in England and Wales: Is it the way forward? (2016) 
20(3) IJEP 235. 
74 Practice Direction: Criminal Proceedings (Various Changes) [2014] EWCA Crim 1569. 
75 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 325, 2011). 
76 CPD, n.48 above, 19A.3. 
77 Tony Ward, ‘“A New and More Rigorous Approach” to Expert Evidence in England and Wales?’ (2015) 19 E&P 228. 
78 Michael Stockdale and Adam Jackson, ‘Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Current Challenges and Opportunities’ 
(2016) 80 J Crim L 344, 348. 
79 [2013] EWCA Crim 2. 
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competent.80 Most scientific, technical and medical forms of evidence should include information 
about validity and reliability. 
First on the list of factors which judges ‘may take into account’ in assessing admissibility is the 
‘validity of the methods by which’ the data supporting the expert’s opinion were obtained.81 PCAST’s 
concepts of ‘foundational validity’ and ‘validity as applied’ are consonant with the common law 
principles that ultimately determine admissibility, and could therefore provide a useful gloss to the 
concept of validity under the Practice Direction. 
What PCAST calls ‘foundational validity’ may bear on the relevance of the evidence but is also 
important in determining whether the evidence will assist the court, while PCAST’s ‘validity as 
applied’ relates both to the common-law test of competence and to the issues highlighted in the 
Practice Direction as to whether the limitations of the forensic practitioner’s methods and data have 
been properly taken into account.82 The test of assistance to the court or ‘helpfulness’ is rather too 
briefly summarised in the Practice Direction as whether the evidence ‘is needed to provide the court 
with information likely to be outside the court's own knowledge and experience’.83 As the Court of 
Appeal explained in Gilfoyle, quoting the leading Scottish case of Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh, it 
is not enough that the information is outside the court’s knowledge. In addition, ‘expert witnesses 
must furnish the court “with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their 
conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the 
application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence”’.84 Without such criteria, the 
information provided by a forensic practitioner cannot be rationally evaluated by the court and is 
therefore not ‘helpful’ or ‘needed’.  
The ‘scientific criteria’ alluded to in Davie must be criteria that are grounded in science but capable 
of application by non-scientists. What PCAST very helpfully does is to propose a set of scientific 
concepts – repeatability, reproducibility and accuracy – which together, in the context of feature-
comparison evidence, can be treated as equivalent to the legal concept of ‘reliability,’ and which are 
reasonably easy for non-scientists to understand and apply. Assessing the degree of reliability in the 
context of the case as a whole is primarily a matter for the jury85 but in order to be ‘sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted’86 the evidence must, we submit, provide sufficient indicia of reliability to 
make such an assessment possible. Crucially, as PCAST urges repeatedly, the jury must be given 
some well-founded estimate of the risk of a ‘false positive’. This provides a common-law basis on 
which to mount an argument that evidence lacking in ‘foundational validity’ is ‘insufficiently reliable 
to be admitted’. So is evidence unsupported by indications of ‘validity as applied’, such as rigorous 
proficiency tests passed by the individual practitioner, because the evidence fails to establish that 
that the witness is competent.87  
The PCAST report also provides an opportunity to reassess judicial guidance on directing the jury in 
Crown Court trials involving expert evidence. The new Crown Court Compendium, to which Judges 
and Recorders should have regard when summing up, contains a summary of the law relating to 
                                                          
80 Dale Nance, ‘Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts’(2003) 34 Seton Hall L Rev 191; Ward, n 77 above  
81 Ibid., 19A.5. 
82 CPD, 19A.5(b), (c), (f), (g), (h); PCAST report, 56. 
83 Ibid., 19A.1. 
84 Gilfoyle [2001]2 Cr App R 5 at 67, Davie v. Edinburgh Magistrates 1953 S.C. 34 at 40. 
85 Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31, [36], again quoting Davie, above. 
86 Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2, CPD 19.4. 
87 PCAST report, 57-59. The Council expressed deep concerns about proficiency tests in use being too easy; addressing the 
need for accreditation but without helping to test abilities or enhance training. 
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expert evidence, guidance as to how to direct the jury in cases involving experts, and an example of 
an appropriate direction for a case involving a handwriting expert.88 
The legal summary in the Compendium suggests that, where an expert testifies as to a degree of 
confidence in a match: 
(e.g. “no support, limited support, moderate support, support, strong support, powerful 
support”) it may help the jury to explain that these terms are no more than labels which the 
witness has applied to his opinion of the significance of his findings and that because such 
opinion is entirely subjective different experts may not attach the same label to the same 
degree of comparability: Atkins.89  
This direction fails to distinguish clearly between relative judgments which have a scientific basis 
(and are used as a purportedly user-friendly substitute for a likelihood ratio) and those which – as in 
Atkins – are what PCAST would call ‘scientifically meaningless’.90 The latter can fairly be described as 
‘entirely subjective’ and the important point to make here is that while the jury might attach some 
weight to a personal opinion based on experience, they should be clear that it is not a scientific 
finding91 and should treat it with caution.92   
The Compendium also indicates that juries should be directed to take into account an expert’s 
‘qualifications/practical experience/methodology/source material/quality of analysis/objectivity of 
the experts, and the impression they make when giving evidence’.93 It is concerning that the experts’ 
methodology – and the validity or otherwise of that methodology – is placed on a par with ‘the 
impression they make’. Juries should not be left ‘to flounder in the formation of a general 
impression,’94 but should be told to focus on whether or not the evidence is based on a method that 
has been validated, and if not (assuming that the evidence is nevertheless deemed ‘sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted’) to treat it with caution. The example direction in the Compendium relates 
to handwriting evidence, which is not discussed by PCAST, but raises similar issues.95 The direction 
does not refer to validity or reliability, nor give jurors any indication of how these might be assessed 
in order that they might evaluate the weight of the evidence. Handwriting comparison evidence is 
likely to remain admissible on the basis that even if it is not science, it is better than unaided lay 
judgment, but we submit that, at the very least, clearer and more cautious guidance is required as to 
its evaluation.96  
 
6. PCAST, validation and the Forensic Science Regulator 
                                                          
88 Judicial College, Crown Court Compendium, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/crown-court-
compendium-part-i-jury-and-trial-management-and-summing-up.pdf <accessed 6th February 2016> at 10-3. 
89 10-3, para 5. See also Gary Edmond et al, ‘Atkins v The Emperor: The “Cautious” use of Unreliable “Expert” Opinion’ 
(2010) 14 IJEP 146. 
90 See above, n 24 and NRC report, 185. 
91 On the need to avoid calling such evidence ‘scientific’, see R v T (Footwear Mark Evidence) [2011] 1 Cr App R 9, [96]. 
92 See R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31, [41-2]. 
93 10-3 para 13(2)(b). See also para 7. 
94 R v Henderson [2010] 2 Cr App R 34, [218]. 
95 See e.g. D. Michael Risinger with Michael J. Saks, ‘Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert meets Forensic 
Handwriting Expertise’ (1996) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 21. 
96 See Jennifer R. Mnookin, ‘Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial 
Construction of Reliability’ (2001) 71 Va. L. Rev. 1723. For the purposes of this article we are neutral as to whether such 
evidence should be admitted.  
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The PCAST report and its legal significance (beyond the United States) find support in the activities of 
the Forensic Science Regulator (UK).97 The office of the Forensic Science Regulator (‘the Regulator’) 
was established in 2007 as a result of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
report identifying that ‘[j]udges are not well placed to determine scientific validity without input 
from scientists.’98 The Regulator considers that the Criminal Practice Directions clarify the 
expectation ‘that all methods routinely employed within the Criminal Justice System (CJS), whether 
for intelligence or evidential use, will be validated prior to their use on live casework material’.99 
Using this definition as the basis of her Guidance FSR-G-201: Validation (hereafter Guidance) on the 
subject,100 the manner and content of the Regulators’ engagement with issues relating to validity is 
largely consistent with that put forward by PCAST. 
The Regulator is responsible for ensuring that the provision of forensic science services across the 
criminal justice system is subject to an appropriate regime of scientific quality standards.101  The 
Regulator publishes Codes of Practice and Conduct specifying the required scientific quality 
standards for providers of laboratory-based forensic science services.102 In addition to the general 
Codes, there are specific Codes for certain forensic disciplines, including some types of feature-
comparison evidence.103 The Regulator also issues guidelines on specific subjects, including 
contamination,104 cognitive bias105 and validation.106 Although all commercial and police providers of 
forensic science evidence are expected to conform to the Regulator’s published standards, neither 
the Codes nor the Guidance have statutory force.107 The Government has recently indicated that it 
‘will develop proposals to give the Forensic Science Regulator statutory powers, to place the current 
remit and the associated Codes of Practice on a statutory basis and enable the Forensic Science 
Regulator to investigate non-compliance where necessary’.108  
                                                          
97 Kent Roach ‘Forensic Science and Miscarriages of Justice: Some Lessons from Comparative Experience’ 
98 Following the closure of the FSS and the HoC Select Committee Report Forensic Science on Trial – consequent need for 
independent regulation. 
99 Forensic Science Regulator, Guidance– Validation (FSR-G-201, 2014) (hereafter Guidance) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/375285/FSR-G-
201_Validation_guidance_November_2014.pdf, accessed 02/01/2017.  
100 Ibid. 
101 The Forensic Science Service dominated the provision of forensic science services until its closure in March 2012, but it 
was never the sole provider of forensic expertise to the police. 
102 Forensic Science Regulator, The Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct for Forensic Science Providers and 
Practitioners in the Criminal Justice System (2015) (hereafter The Codes) available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-science-providers-codes-of-practice-and-conduct,  para 1.1. 
Accessed 02/01/2017. 
103 See Forensic Science Regulator: Code of Practice and Conduct 2015: fingerprint comparison available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/forensic-science-providers-codes-of-practice-and-conduct-2015; DNA 
analysis: codes of practice and conduct (2014) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dna-analysis-
codes-of-practice-and-conduct; Video analysis: codes of practice for forensic service providers (2014) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/video-analysis-codes-of-practice-for-forensic-service-providers. Accessed 
02/01/2017. 
104 Forensic Science Regulator: Crime scene DNA: anti-contamination guidance (2016) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/crime-scene-dna-anti-contamination-guidance; Laboratory DNA: anti-
contamination guidance (2015) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/laboratory-dna-anti-
contamination-guidance. Accessed 02/01/2017. 
105 Cognitive bias effects relevant to forensic science examinations. See also Gary Edmond, Rachel Searston, Jason Tangen 
and Itiel Dror, ‘Contextual bias and cross-contamination in the forensic sciences: The corrosive implications for 
investigations, plea bargains, trials and appeals’ (2014) 13 Law, Probability & Risk 1-25. 
106 Guidance, n 99 above. 
107 Annual Report Forensic Science Regulator, Annual Report 2015 (2015) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/forensic-science-regulator-annual-report-2015, accessed 02/01/2017 
108 Forensic Science Strategy (Cm 9217) March 2016, para. 44. 
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The Codes of Practice and Conduct for forensic science providers and practitioners in the criminal 
justice system confirm that it is the duty of individual providers to ensure that all methods and 
procedures that are used are validated.109 Validation ‘may be performed by the provider, 
manufacturer or another provider’.110 The Codes state that validation should ensure that ‘results are 
consistent, reliable, accurate, robust and with an uncertainty measurement’, echoing PCAST’s 
concerns that results should be repeatable, reproducible and accurate.111  
Both the Regulator and PCAST are advocates for the central role of validity as a precursor to the 
forensic application of any scientific method or technique. Their definitions are similar and 
consistent112 in holding that validation entails a demonstration of reliability.113 The Guidance is 
emphatic regarding the importance of conducting validation studies. The Code requires 
documentation to state that validation has been completed114 given that ‘forensic science is 
science’:115 
[T]he requirement to demonstrate the reliability of scientific evidence clearly extends to any 
methodology when the operation has an impact in the result obtained, wherever it is used. 
Therefore validation should be the norm.116 
Like PCAST, the Regulator is sensitive117 to the distinction between foundational validity and validity 
as applied, referring to them as ‘external/developmental validation’ and ‘internal validation’ 
respectively.118 The issue of proficiency testing raised by PCAST is also addressed by the Regulator as 
‘technical competence’.119 Here the Regulator engages in a more expansive consideration of 
validation opportunities (and requirements) associated with applied science than considered by 
PCAST in the forensic feature-comparison context. For example, the Regulator suggest that the 
following specifications should be articulated for any method implementing a scientific model or 
theory: 
i. The validity of the model/theory; 
ii. The validity of the application of the model/theory in the method; 
… 
iv. The validity of the assumptions and any limits on the application of the 
assumptions;120 
The importance of identifying and communicating error and uncertainty logically flows from 
considerations of validity and is explicitly articulated by both the Regulator and PCAST. For the 
Regulator, the specification of the application of a scientific model or theory should entail a 
consideration of ‘any issues or limitations’121 or ‘any caveats that might apply, e.g., error rates’.122 
                                                          
109 The Codes, 20.1.1. 
110 Ibid., 20.2.1. 
111Ibid., 20.8.2 (l). 
112 Guidance, 2.2.2 and PCAST p 4-5 (1). 
113 Ibid., 1.1.1: ‘can be shown to be reliable’; PCAST, 4-5(1): ‘can, in principle, be reliable.” 
114 Ibid., 1.1.9. 
115 Ibid., 1.1.1. 
116 Ibid., 3.3.3. 
117 Ibid., 1.1.5 – 1.1.6. 
118 Ibid.,  4.2.6 - 4.2.7. 
119 Ibid., Section 4.3. 
120 Ibid., 4.4.10. 
121 Ibid., 4.4.11. 
122 Ibid.,  3.4.2. 
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Along with PCAST, the Regulator considers this information to be vital and requires it to be 
communicated clearly.123 The Regulator even suggests a possible model for how error rates might be 
reported: ‘e.g., an x% error rate’.124 Issues associated with the uncertainty of measurement are also 
given detailed consideration by the Regulator; with an entire section devoted to the concepts of 
accuracy and precision.125 Both PCAST and the Regulator insist that it is not enough to merely 
complete the requisite validation work. It is, in addition, vital for validation results to be peer 
reviewed, published and made accessible to the public (particularly attentive scientists): ‘the 
Regulator is very clear that “secret science” is not in the interests of transparent justice.’126 
As explained in Sections 4 and 5, the Codes could be used as a basis for asking a forensic practitioner 
to demonstrate the foundational validity of her method. Currently this is not a feature of legal 
practice in England and Wales. As with the CPD, there are few reported cases where advocates or 
judges refer to the Regulator’s Codes or Guidance in support of a submission that expert evidence 
should be excluded (either on the basis that it is non-compliant and therefore insufficiently reliable 
or under s.78 of PACE), or even as part of the cross-examination of a forensic practitioner in a review 
of the weight of the evidence.127 The PCAST report could inform the way Codes and Guidance are 
used to mount challenges to the reports and testimony of forensic practitioners in feature-
comparison cases. 
The existence of an independent framework for regulation does not yet appear to be ensuring the 
validity and reliability of forensic science methods in practice. For, as the Regulator’s Guidance on 
validity makes clear, ‘[t]he responsibility for validation rests with the forensic science provider’.128 
This assumes that commercial providers can be relied upon to commit resources to developing and 
conducting studies of the type and on the scale PCAST recommends. Yet, there are few incentives 
for an individual provider to conduct the sort of research that might be capable of establishing 
foundational validity, particularly where this is not expressly requested (or required by courts) and 
there is a risk that a method – relied upon as a source of income – might be found to be invalid. 
There is little evidence that the black-box studies envisaged by PCAST are being conducted or that 
indicative error rates are being measured and reported as a matter of routine. Simultaneously, 
resource pressures and the drive for efficiency – exemplified in the emergence of streamlined 
forensic reports – are working to reduce the amount of information available to decision-makers 
(including the defence). Such orientations tend to elide the lack of validation and uncertainties 
around the prevalence of errors, and therefore reduce the prospects of identifying or challenging 
evidence that is speculative or unreliable. They discourage transparency and accountability and in 
                                                          
123 Ibid., 3.4.3. 
124 Ibid., 3.4.3. See also Guide, n 28 above. 
125 Ibid., section 7. 
126 Ibid., 4.4.5. The contention that proprietary interests should override the interests or ability of criminal justice actors to 
obtain access to information has been criticised by Lord Thomas, CJ, ‘Expert evidence and the future of forensic science in 
criminal trials’. Speech presented at the Criminal Bar Association Kalisher Lecture; 2014, 14 October. 
127 The only references to the Forensic Science Regulator, revealingly relate to DNA challenges and one fingerprint appeal. 
Notwithstanding more serious question marks hanging over other forensic comparison methods, lawyers and judges have 
focused almost exclusively on DNA evidence. This is ironic, because, without wanting to suggest that DNA techniques are 
without their problems, they are some of the few techniques that came from science and have been largely validated. 
Many techniques that remain unvalidated are yet to be challenged by (supposedly attentive and critical) defence counsel. 
See, for example, Smith v R [2011] EWCA Crim 1296 at [10], [62] (fingerprints); Broughton v R [2010] EWCA Crim 549 at 
[33]-[34] (Low template DNA); Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2 at [23], [29] (Low template DNA – mixed profile without 
random match probabilities); Reed and Reed v R [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 at [5], [72]-[73], [111], [116] (Low template DNA). 
128 Guidance, 8.1.1. 
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the process do not to convey what is actually known about procedures and the evidence they 
generate.  
Significantly, there is no group in the United Kingdom undertaking the kind of evidence review (or 
meta-analysis) performed by PCAST for the various forensic feature-comparison methods. It is one 
thing for the Forensic Science Regulator to develop guidelines and policy documents.129 It is quite 
another for them to be adopted or enforced. But, to actually review the available evidence to inform 
practice is necessary if we hope to provide decision-makers – whether investigators, prosecutors, 
defence lawyers, judges and juries – with the materials to make informed and defensible decisions.  
By virtue of her engagement with validation for all, rather than just the forensic feature-comparison, 
methods, the Forensic Science Regulator is concerned with the institutional context and the 
management of risk in a way that PCAST is not. For example, although PCAST clearly considers 
admissibility for the purpose of minimising wrongful convictions and improving the performance of 
criminal justice systems, the Regulator devotes a subsection of the Guidance to articulating and 
exploring a risk assessment framework to be informed by validation results.130 Explicit consideration 
is given not only to wrongful convictions, but also the potential for wrongful acquittals and 
obstructing and delaying investigations.131 In addition, the risk assessment process is intended to aid 
the development of validation studies, to ensure ‘that the validation study correctly assesses 
whether the risk mitigation put in place works’.132 It also proposes that the process of risk 
assessment should take into account the likely weight of the evidence as well as additional 
information about the method (for example the accuracy of its output, the extent to which its 
output can be influenced by context, the meaning of absent information, and the potential for 
delays in the application of the method). These considerations are both complex and worthy of 
attention. Their explicit consideration by the Regulator is valuable, if only to illustrate that validation 
information ultimately serves to inform a complex decision environment. 
Despite similarities with the PCAST report the Regulator’s activities are not without limitation. PCAST 
purposefully focused on a subset of forensic science practices (i.e. feature-comparison methods) in 
order to make concrete recommendations specific to those areas. The President’s Council proposed 
a research design considered optimal for the purpose of producing relevant validation data (i.e., 
‘appropriately designed black-box studies).133 By contrast the Regulator is obliged to develop 
materials that apply across the forensic sciences. An unfortunate consequence is that the diversity in 
forensic science practice (from analytical chemistry to visual feature-comparison) has 
understandably limited the extent to which the Regulator can offer discipline specific 
recommendations on validation. While the Guidance is unapologetically ‘descriptive rather than 
prescriptive in style’,134 its generality may have resulted in the provision of advice that may be 
problematic in some instances. The Regulator’s position on the use of case materials for validation 
purposes – at least as applied to the feature-comparison disciplines – provides one example. 
The Regulator suggests that: 
                                                          
129 The consistencies are more important than the differences. Both stress the primacy of validation. While we accept that 
there may be scope to disagree with or qualify aspects of PCAST, the NRC report and even the FSR’s advice and guidelines, 
there is little scope to question the need to validate most procedures used in forensic science and medicine – especially 
those in routine use. Moreover, there is a need to direct attention to limitations, error and cognitive bias.  
130 Guidance, 5.4. 
131 Ibid., 5.4.3.a-c. 
132 Ibid., 5.4.2. 
133 PCAST report, 46. 
134 Guidance, 2.3.2. 
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the use of casework material [for validation] is valuable in many areas because it may be 
difficult to generate a set of test data that adequately reflect the range, quality and 
complexity of the material submitted in case work.135 
However, this suggestion is in direct contrast to the advice offered by PCAST: 
… one cannot reliably estimate error rates from casework because one typically does not have 
independent knowledge of the ‘ground truth’ or ‘right answer’.136 
The extent to which the Regulator is conscious of this fundamental concern is unclear. For example 
the Guidance suggests the there is a real risk that ‘different results may be obtained in the 
validations study’ compared to the casework, giving rise to the possibility that an error had been 
made in the case.137 However, without ground truth, if the original casework and validation 
conclusions differ the source of the error is unknown. Interestingly, the Regulator’s apparent 
reticence with the use of casework material for validation purposes is primarily concerned with the 
need for permission rather than guaranteeing that the materials are fit for purpose.138 
Despite this significant departure from the recommendations in the PCAST report, the Regulator and 
PCAST are in lockstep both about the fundamental importance of validity and the requirement for it 
to be demonstrated and communicated if we hope to improve the quality of forensic science 
evidence. 
Conclusion 
The PCAST report both highlights and extends the important work of the Forensic Science Regulator. 
Not only does the PCAST report, like the NRC report before it, lend very considerable weight to the 
need for validation of procedures used in forensic science (and medicine), PCAST went further and 
actually reviewed the evidence available for a range of procedures. The result of that review, by 
independent scientists, might come as a surprise to English lawyers and judges. Five of seven 
feature-comparison methods were found to lack evidence of foundational validity. While the 
methods selected might not be representative, they include some of the most widely used 
techniques in the US and UK. In parallel to developments in the US, the Forensic Science Regulator 
has been actively developing advisory codes and guidelines to inform and improve practice. 
However, the Regulator is not in a position to review experts’ reports or the evidence base for 
particular procedures or even ‘fields’ to ascertain whether codes and guidance have been followed. 
The lawyers and courts practically responsible for regulating expert reports have been slow to 
engage with new procedural rules and materials published by the Regulator. 
A second point to make in conclusion is that there are few grounds for believing that English criminal 
justice institutions, traditions and practices can somehow circumvent the force of the general 
scientific critique offered by PCAST. According to the NRC, PCAST and the Forensic Science 
Regulator, ‘nothing can substitute’ for validation: ‘[f]oundational validity is a sine qua non, which can 
only be shown through empirical studies.’139 Cross-examination, judicial warnings, long experience, 
                                                          
135 Guidance, 6.1.2. See also Forensic Science Regulator, Protocol: Validation of Casework Material (FSR-P-300, 2016) 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/510850/Protocol_on_Casework_Materia
l_Issue_1.pdf, accessed 02/02/2017. 
136 PCAST report, 33. 
137 Guidance, 6.1.6. 
138 Ibid., 6.1.8 
139 PCAST report, 147. 
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other evidence, historical reliance, apparent plausibility, the existence of standards and 
accreditation, proficiency testing (and so on) cannot substitute for validation. None of these tell us 
whether a procedure works, in what conditions and how well. If, however, juries are to be left to 
evaluate purportedly scientific evidence in the absence of such information, they should at least be 
informed in the clearest possible terms of the importance of the information that is missing.  
Thirdly, if we accept that validation is fundamental, and cannot be replaced by other activities (legal 
or scientific), then the review of evidence undertaken by a group of scientists in the United States 
suggesting that some procedures do not have the required support would appear to have direct 
application to the feature-comparison methods in use in the United Kingdom. An unlikely exception 
might arise if English forensic scientists could point to credible validation studies not considered by 
PCAST. For those who would argue that the PCAST report’s findings to do not apply to the forensic 
feature-comparison methods used in England and Wales, we would inquire as to the results of 
rigorous validation studies. To the contention that things are very different in England and Wales 
(from many jurisdictions in the US) we would agree, but nevertheless once again ask for evidence 
that any particular difference or set of differences matter. In the absence of empirical evidence, we 
cannot be confident about English (or Canadian or Australian and so forth) practices, training and 
traditions in forensic science and medicine or law making a meaningful difference to performance or 
reliability.  
English lawyers and judges should engage with their procedural rules as well as the kinds of insights 
provided by the NRC, the Forensic Science Regulator and now PCAST. The latter infuse the rules and 
practice directions with meaning and might help to reform admissibility practices. The PCAST report 
identifies some of the dangers with the traditional ‘laissez faire’ approach to admissibility as well as 
the threat posed to both truth and fairness where procedures are not formally evaluated in ways 
that would satisfy independent scientists. 
 
 
